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How do people decide what is right and wrong, and to what extent are
their actions guided by such moral considerations? Inspired by philosophi-
cal traditions, early approaches to morality focused on rationality, and
assumed that people arrive at moral standards by logical thought. More
recently, however, psychologists have explored the inﬂuence of emotions
and intuitions on morality, and evidence has been accumulating that moral
decisions and behaviors are far from rational, but instead, are guided by
intuitions and situational considerations. For example, seemingly irrelevant
concerns such as keeping one’s mind and spirit clean and pure can change
people’s moral judgment. Emotions can also inﬂuence behavior, and posi-
tive, uplifting emotions such as elevation and gratitude can be harnessed to
produce beneﬁcial outcomes for individuals and organizations alike. Fur-
thermore, people appear to aspire to an equilibrium of moral self-worth,
and engage in more or less ethical behavior depending on their currently
perceived moral integrity. Thus, morality and ethical behavior is less likely
to reside in the person than in the context, and thus, for the study of spiri-
tuality, it might be beneﬁcial to focus on people’s situational constraints in
the workplace rather than their stable dispositions. Further, because of their
potential to inspire positive action, organizations might aim to make posi-
tive moral emotions, such as gratitude, elevation, and awe part of everyday
work contexts. Overall, in organizations and the workplace, the goal shifts
from trying to identify the moral individual to providing the contextual
conditions that appeal to spiritual concerns in order to foster moral
behavior.
Keywords: emotion; intuition; morality; ethics; workplace; organizational
behavior
In his book “The Happiness Hypothesis” Haidt (2006, p. 239) concludes
an extensive review of insights from psychological research and works of
ancient wisdom such as religious and philosophical writings with the following
recommendation for the life lived well: “Just as plants need sun, water, and
good soil to thrive, people need love, work, and a connection to something
larger”. This recommendation emphasizes the centrality of ﬁnding meaning in
one’s work, and because illuminating people’s desire for a connection to
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something larger has been an emerging goal across many theoretical and prac-
tical disciplines (e.g. LaPierre 1994, Zinnbauer et al. 1999, Hill et al. 2000,
Elkins 2001, Emmons and Paloutzian 2003, Miller and Thoresen 2003),
recently various authors have started exploring how people’s spiritual experi-
ences and religious practices relate to their work lives (e.g. Mitroff and Denton
1999, Biberman and Tischler 2008, Gotsis and Kortezi 2008, Giacalone and
Jurkiewicz 2010a).
Although the lack of acknowledged deﬁnitions of spirituality and religion
has been pointed out as a factor in hampering research developments (e.g. Geh
and Tan 2009, Giacalone and Jurkiewicz 2010b), in scientiﬁc psychology,
tremendous progress has been made in areas in which deﬁnitional issues
continue to stir debate, as is the case in the ﬁeld of emotion. For example, one
scientiﬁc volume entitled The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions
(1994) considers basic questions relating to deﬁnitional issues, with various
eminent researchers giving their very distinct and often contradictory answers.
Although the eternal debates regarding deﬁnitional and other basic questions go
on, in the meantime researchers seem to have decided to just “get on with it”
and study emotional phenomena anyway. More problematic for a research ﬁeld,
however, is the lack of commonly agreed methods, which makes empirical
evidence difﬁcult to compare from study to study, therefore impeding progress,
and this has been noted as a problem for the ﬁeld of workplace spirituality
(Gotsis and Kortezi 2008, Giacalone and Jurkiewicz 2010b). Because of the lack
of grounding of the approach in theory, Giacalone and Jurkiewicz (2010b)
suggest that studying workplace spirituality would greatly beneﬁt from interdis-
ciplinary links with research areas in which empirical progress has been made.
One such area is the ﬁeld of morality, which has recently seen a great resurgence
in empirical interest in how emotions guide people’s moral choices.
Although some argue that spiritual factors might not be open to being fully
studied by traditional scientiﬁc methods (e.g. Biberman and Tischler 2008), we
disagree with them. As noted by others (Miller and Thorensen 2003), many
unobservable psychological phenomena have been empirically studied with
established methods with great success, such as implicit cognitive processes,
emotional feelings, and, as we will review, topics as elusive as what factors
shape people’s moral considerations.
Morality concerns how people tell right from wrong, and has been studied
by philosophers for thousands of years. Recently, the study of morality has
moved from the philosopher’s armchair to the psychologist’s laboratory. It used
to be assumed that moral decisions are based only on rational thought, such
that people decide based upon objective facts and logical consideration what is
morally acceptable behavior. However, recent empirical ﬁndings suggest that
decisions about morality and ethical behavior are far from rational, but are
often guided by emotion and other intuitions. In this paper, we review some of
the key ﬁndings in the emerging ﬁeld of moral psychology, namely that
people’s emotions and intuitions can inﬂuence their judgments and behaviors,
and that people generally strive to conﬁrm their moral self-worth. We then
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conclude with speculations and possible research questions applying these ﬁnd-
ings to the workplace.
Within organizations and work contexts, decisions are made and actions are
taken that can have various implications regarding the ethical conduct of an
individual, or the organization as a whole. Factors involved in ethical behavior
on the level of organizations have been discussed in details by others (e.g.
Schwepker 2001, Tenbrunsel et al. 2003, Treviño et al. 2006, Collins 2010),
and ethical climates have been investigated in the context of spirituality
(Parbotheeah and Cullen 2010). However, because the decision-making within
an organization is generally made by individuals or small groups of individu-
als, the factors involved in ethical and moral decisions and behaviors that are
relevant on the individual level equally apply to the organizational level, and
this will be the focus of the present paper.
Studying morality: early beginnings
Questions of morality have constituted a key domain within philosophy. Of
particular interest has been normative ethics, namely how one ought to act and
how moral standards are formed, and the extent to which people apply such
standards when judging their own and others’ behaviors. Within philosophy,
many thinkers have attempted to arrive at universal principles that if observed
would result in exemplary moral behavior. Kant (1788/1997), for example, in
his Categorical Imperative proposed that there are absolute, objective truths
within the moral domain and that it is our duty to use reason to discover these
truths. Other philosophers also arrived at general rules on how people should
behave. Mill (1863) in his essay on utilitarianism declared that each individual
must do whatever brings the greatest amount of happiness to the largest num-
ber of people. Such rational views within philosophy have been inﬂuential
because they provide speciﬁc rules regarding how people should behave. How-
ever, it is important at this point in this discussion to observe that knowing
how we should behave does not tell us how we actually do behave, or why. In
contrast to this rational tradition, Hume (1751) proposed that because humans
are sentimental beings, moral decisions cannot be purely derived through
reason, and that instead, people rely on their feelings when deciding between
right and wrong.
Whereas philosophy has attempted to decide between different approaches
to morality based on theoretical consideration, more recently empirical psy-
chologists have tested speciﬁc hypotheses derived from different theories.
Within psychology, rational models have been highly inﬂuential, and only
recently a shift has taken place to move to more sentimentally inspired models.
Kohlberg’s (1981) widely-cited work proposed that children progress through
discrete stages of moral development as they acquire more and more advanced
reasoning abilities, and that fully developed moral reasoning is so sophisticated
that even many adults never reach the most advanced level of moral thought.
In contrast to such rational models of morality, increasingly moral
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psychologists have taken seriously Hume’s early suggestion that moral deci-
sions are guided by various feelings. The most inﬂuential such approach has
been Haidt’s (2001) Social Intuitionist Model, which proposes that moral judg-
ments are the result of automatic intuitive responses to moral stimuli that take
place largely outside of conscious awareness, with people producing rational
arguments only later when trying to justify their judgments. Others (e.g.
Greene 2007, Paxton and Greene 2010) have suggested that both rational and
emotional considerations can play a role, and although the precise contribution
of emotion in moral judgment is still under discussion (Huebner et al. 2009),
evidence is accumulating to support the conclusion that emotions are critically
involved in moral judgment.
Within the growing ﬁeld of moral psychology, several ﬁndings have
emerged. First, people do not always use only rational thinking when deciding
whether something is right or wrong. Instead, emotions and intuitions often
guide people’s moral judgments. Second, moral emotions are fundamentally
social, and can have profound effects on behavior. Third, people aspire to an
equilibrium of moral self-worth and engage in compensatory behavior to either
raise or lower their current level of moral worth. Empirical ﬁndings on which
these conclusions are based will be reviewed next.
Looking up: embodied metaphors of the divine
Haidt (2006) proposes that, in general, social relationships consist of three
dimensions that can be represented spatially. One dimension involves close
interpersonal relationships to those who are next to us, and on the same level
as us, namely friends and signiﬁcant others. Another dimension concerns hier-
archical relationships, for example, between a boss and an employee, or a tea-
cher and a student. A third moral dimension can be spatially represented along
the vertical, and consists of what Haidt (2006) termed the dimension of divin-
ity, with or without God. This dimension concerns spiritual considerations that
appear to be largely universal across different cultures, and involves the quest
to look for something larger and higher than oneself. In the context of this ver-
tical dimension, recent research ﬁndings from the newly emerging ﬁeld of
embodied cognition are very relevant.
Approaches of embodied cognition suggest that the way we function in the
world with, and through, our bodies, fundamentally shapes our cognitive pro-
cesses (for reviews, see Barsalou 2008, Spellman and Schnall 2009). From this
perspective, metaphors are considered to have a bodily basis, because they
reﬂect direct physical experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For example,
the spatial concept of verticality is easy to understand because human beings
usually function in an upright position, and it is clear what is up and what is
down, relative to one’s body. The notion of verticality is invoked when consid-
ering good or bad things such as emotions, and using expressions such as:
“being on top of the world”, vs. “being depressed” or literally feeling pushed
down, or de-pressed (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). However, these metaphors
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are not only used as ﬁgures of speech, but reﬂect underlying cognitive pro-
cesses: People indeed seem to represent good things as spatially-up, and bad
things as spatially-down. For example, research participants are faster to cate-
gorize positive words as “good” when they are presented in the top section of
a computer screen, and negative words as “bad” when they are presented in
the bottom section (Meier and Robinson 2004). Further, people relate vertical-
ity to the moral dimension, and automatically link morality and vertical space
of up and down (e.g. being “high minded” vs. “underhanded”). However,
moral considerations and verticality are not associated by those who lack the
awareness of social and moral concern: psychopaths (Meier et al. 2007b).
Furthermore, people not only think of all things good and moral as up, but
they also think of God as up and the Devil as down, and are faster to catego-
rize words such as Almighty or Lord if presented in an up location and Satan
or Demon in a down location (Meier et al. 2007a). Not surprisingly, those in
power are also conceptualized as being high up relative to those down below
over whom they exert control (Schubert 2005). It is thus no coincidence that
people in charge of companies or organizations usually have their ofﬁces on
the top ﬂoor of the building rather than in the basement.
The notion of verticality that elevates people is only one embodied meta-
phor that has consequences for spirituality; another such metaphor concerns
people’s basic physical desire to keep the body clean and pure, and free of
contamination. As will be reviewed in the next section, recent research has
shown that changing one’s bodily state from dirty, disgusting, and animal-like
to clean, pure, and God-like is often an attempt to reaching up higher; that
“cleanliness is next to Godliness” has been a well-recognized fact in many
spiritual practices.
Moral foundations: emotions and other intuitions
In empirical psychology, early work on morality built on rational approaches
within philosophy, and focused on concerns of preventing harm and maintain-
ing fairness (e.g. Kohlberg 1981, Turiel 1983). However, recent work has
identiﬁed ﬁve moral foundations (Haidt and Joseph 2007, Graham et al. 2009).
Ensuring fairness and preventing harm to others are clearly important, but in
addition, many societies uphold norms that do not relate to such objective stan-
dards. According to moral foundation theory, people aim to protect the rights
of their own in-group. In other words, I might judge whether something is fair
or harmless differently, depending on whether the person concerned is like me,
or unlike me. Further, many societies have both formal and informal rules to
ensure that status and hierarchy are maintained and respected. Finally, individ-
uals aim to maintain a pure body and spirit by avoiding physical contamina-
tion. This moral intuition of purity has generated a lot of research interest,
presumably because more than any other intuition, it seems especially “irratio-
nal”, and yet, has proven to be highly inﬂuential because it has the potential to
link up mere lowly mortals with the sacred forces high above.
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In this context, feelings of disgust constitute a threat to the desired state of
physical and spiritual purity. Evolutionarily, disgust has several basic functions
(Rozin et al. 2008). On one level, disgust is thought to have evolved as an
emotion that protects from various contaminants, such as spoilt food, bad taste,
and unpleasant odors, to ensure one does not take in substances that may be
harmful or even deadly (Rozin et al. 2008). In addition to the avoidance of
toxins that might be ingested by mouth, disgust also guards against the touch-
ing of contaminated substances, and of parasites and pathogens that might be
harmful by contact, thus avoiding the dangers of infection and disease (Schal-
ler and Duncan 2007). Beyond this relatively basic, body-based function, dis-
gust responses have also been demonstrated in the social domain; socio-moral
disgust is the term to describe the revulsion one feels when confronted with
immoral behaviors of others that violate established norms (Rozin et al. 2008).
Thus, bad people can be as disgusting as bad food.
In addition to this food-based disgust, another type of disgust has been
called animal-nature disgust (Rozin et al. 2008), which describes people’s
emotional response of repulsion whenever it is evident that human beings are
evolutionarily very similar to other non-human animals. As a consequence,
human bodily functions, especially those relating to bodily wastes and repro-
duction, are considered animal-like and therefore disgusting. People appear to
have a desire to see themselves as enjoying a special, elevated status relative
to other creatures, and therefore, they go to great efforts to distinguish them-
selves from animals. Presumably, the main reason for the discomfort associated
with reminders of human beings’ animal nature is that they make salient one’s
ultimate mortality. Thus, disgust is a complex emotion that despite its direct
physical basis has various spiritual and moral implications.
Although some have argued that using the term “disgust” when referring to
moral transgressions is only metaphorical (Nabi 2002), there is reason to
believe that this is not the case. For example, functional neuroimaging studies
have shown that the same brain structures are implicated in the experience of
physical and socio-moral disgust (Moll et al. 2005, Borg et al. 2008). Further,
experimental manipulations of physical disgust have been shown to inﬂuence
people’s judgments of socio-moral disgust. Wheatley and Haidt (2005) used
hypnotic suggestion to induce participants to experience a brief pang of disgust
whenever they read the emotionally neutral word “often” (or in a different con-
dition, “take”). Subsequent judgments of moral wrongness indicated that par-
ticipants rated other people’s behaviors as more wrong if the story contained
that speciﬁc word, which triggered disgust. What makes such inﬂuence of
emotions on judgments so difﬁcult to control in everyday organizational con-
texts is the fact that people are usually not aware of this connection; in fact,
research participants will often deny that they were inﬂuenced by anything
other than rational consideration, and sometimes even “confabulate” when
asked to give reasons for their judgments.
Further tests of the implicit connection between physical and socio-moral
disgust were conducted by Schnall et al. (2008b). In one study, passers-by on
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a university campus were asked to rate a series of stories for moral wrongness.
Unbeknownst to participants, the experimenter had sprayed a commercially
available “fart spray” into a nearby trash can to create an unpleasant smell.
Indeed, participants who were exposed to the disgusting smell of fart spray
judged various moral transgressions, such as falsifying a resume or not return-
ing a lost wallet, to be more wrong than participants who were not exposed to
the smell. Similarly, in a different study, participants who happened to sit at a
disgusting table surrounded by dirty pizza boxes and used tissues made more
severe moral judgments than participants sitting at the same table when it was
clean and tidy (Schnall et al. 2008a,b). All these ﬁndings suggest that partici-
pants in the disgust conditions conﬂated experiences of physical and moral dis-
gust. In other words, the sense of “that’s disgusting!” was interpreted to be
indicative of moral rejection when in fact the feeling was actually based on the
irrelevant bad smell or the dirty environment surrounding the person while
making the judgment. Thus, a dirty work place might change the way people
make moral decisions; further, it is likely that the actions of people who are
typically considered disgusting (e.g. homeless people) might be judged
especially harshly.
Additional ﬁndings relating physical disgust to morality come from studies
examining dispositional differences regarding a person’s tendency to be easily
disgusted. Jones and Fitness (2008) found that jurors in a mock trial who were
high on trait disgust sensitivity were more likely to issue a guilty verdict to a
defendant in a rape trial. Further, the more sensitive people are to disgust, the
more negative are their attitudes toward homosexuality (Inbar et al. 2009).
Politically conservative attitudes are predicted by high levels of trait disgust
sensitivity (Inbar et al. 2009) and conservative people are more likely to con-
sider disgusting (but non-harmful) behaviors as immoral (Graham et al. 2009).
All this research suggests that one’s own feelings of disgust can be (mis)
interpreted as evidence of bad behaviors and bad people, and because such
inﬂuences tend to occur outside of conscious awareness, they could negatively
impact various organizational situations that require judging people’s character
and abilities. In particular, with relevance to the workplace, the link between
judgments about people, morality, and disgust highlights the need for objective
procedures in the recruitment process, and when it comes to professional
advancement within an organization, to avoid the inﬂuence of automatic dis-
gust responses to groups such as homosexuals, the facially disﬁgured (Park
et al. 2003), or the obese (Puhl and Brownell 2001).
On the ﬂip side of disgust, additional support for the moral intuition of pur-
ity has come from studies manipulating physical purity and looking at the
effect on morality, and these studies show that people somehow equate physi-
cal purity with mental and spiritual purity. The ﬁrst demonstration of this was
aptly termed the “Macbeth Effect” after Lady Macbeth who desperately tried
to alleviate her guilty conscience by washing her hands after having committed
murder. Results from several studies showed that after being reminded of the
immoral deeds they had committed in the past, participants showed a greater
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desire to wash themselves (Zhong and Liljenquest 2006). Such cleansing
desires are speciﬁc to the modality of the offense: After speaking immoral
things, people want to use mouthwash, but after typing something immoral,
people want to use a hand-sanitizer (Lee and Schwarz 2010a). Further, being
primed with words related to cleanliness or engaging in hand washing can
change people’s moral judgments, and make moral judgments less severe when
they misattributed feelings of cleanliness to the transgressions under consider-
ations (Schnall et al. 2008a), but less severe when the cleanliness is misattrib-
uted to the self (Zhong et al. 2010b). Recent ﬁndings suggest that the effects
of cleansing the hands can go beyond the moral domain, and, for example,
reduce the cognitive dissonance that would otherwise be experienced after
having made a difﬁcult decision (Lee and Schwarz 2010b). An intriguing
possibility is that being clean is not merely the absence of disgust, but that the
desire for cleanliness made possible one of the most basic behavior among
conspeciﬁcs, namely social grooming (Schnall 2011). This might mean that
being clean indicates to others that a person has good social relationships, and
therefore is a good cooperative partner, a consideration that is critical in work
contexts requiring reliability and trustworthiness.
Thus, there might be something special about keeping the body clean in
order to keep the spirit clean, and some people consider this especially impor-
tant. A recent meta-analysis (Saroglou 2010) of data from over 20,000 people
from 19 countries concluded that the personality variable conscientiousness,
which indicates a desire for order and doing things the “right way”, is associ-
ated with various aspects of religiosity and spirituality, thus suggesting that
cleanliness, tidiness, and order can critically relate to moral aspects of life.
Of course, disgust and cleanliness are not the only feelings that are relevant
within moral contexts. Anger is typically the result of frustration because of
the blocking of one’s goals (e.g. Plutchik 1980). Within the moral domain,
anger or moral outrage often results from witnessing immoral behaviors that
result in harm to others (e.g. Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla 2007), and experi-
ences of anger predict condemnation of moral transgressions involving justice
violations (Horberg et al. 2009).
Anger is an emotion that is commonly experienced in the work place (for a
review, see Gibson and Callister 2010). The most frequently cited reasons for
feeling anger are being treated unfairly or unjustly, such as having one’s contri-
bution overlooked or being unfairly accused of an offense, and observing oth-
ers’ unethical behavior such as witnessing dishonesty (Fitness 2000). How
anger is perceived and whether it motivates speciﬁc action can differ as a func-
tion of the status of the person (e.g. boss vs. employee) experiencing it. Fitness
(2000) found that interactions between supervisors and subordinates were situ-
ations that commonly triggered an anger response in either or both parties;
within these anger-eliciting situations, supervisors were much more likely to
immediately confront the subordinate than subordinates confronting supervi-
sors. In contrast, anger-eliciting co-workers were confronted less often than
subordinates, but more often than supervisors.
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Although witnessing moral transgressions can elicit both feelings of disgust
and anger (Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla 2007), we have recently shown differ-
ential emotional responses as a function of the speciﬁc content of moral
offenses (Cannon et al. 2011). We recorded the facial muscle activity relating
to disgust and anger while participants considered third-person statements
describing good and bad behaviors across a range of moral domains. Facial
disgust was highest in response to purity violations, followed by fairness
violations. In contrast, harm violations evoked anger expressions. Furthermore,
the amount of facial muscle activity predicted participants’ moral judgments:
Perceived severity of purity and fairness transgressions correlated with facial
disgust, whereas harm transgressions correlated with facial anger. These
ﬁndings suggest that people automatically show a quick emotional response
when exposed to moral offenses, which in turn relates to their explicit moral
judgments.
Moral emotions and behavior
In addition to investigating how people decide what is right and wrong,
researchers have also examined how people behave as a function of the spe-
ciﬁc moral emotions they experience. Of recent interest has been the role of
positive moral emotions. Following the movement of positive psychology (e.g.
Keyes and Haidt 2003), positive organizational scholarship has made it its mis-
sion to examine positive factors that make ﬂourishing and resilience possible
within organizational contexts (Cameron et al. 2003), and to take a more bal-
anced view of what is positive and negative about people’s behaviors (Luthans
and Youssef 2007). Positive emotions have been noted to set in motion mutu-
ally beneﬁcial processes of cooperation within workplace contexts (Sekerka
and Fredrickson 2010). For example, because gratitude is a profoundly social
emotion that by deﬁnition requires at least two people, it can play a critical
role in the interplay of people within organizations (Emmons 2003). Further,
well-being involving positive emotions in the workplace and productivity and
proﬁts are not mutually exclusive, but in fact, often go hand in hand (Harter
et al. 2003). Thus, individuals’ striving for spirituality and transcendence might
not be as incompatible with organizations’ goals as it might superﬁcially
appear (Ashford and Pratt 2010).
With regard to the embodied spatial metaphors mentioned above (Lakoff
and Johnson 1980), some of these emotions are experienced as spiritually
uplifting, elevating, and bringing people closer to higher goals. Algoe and
Haidt (2009) explored the extent to which so-called “other-praising” emotions
such as elevation, admiration, and gratitude are different from more generic
positive emotions such as happiness or amusement. These moral emotions
were indeed found to result in different experiences and cognitive appraisals
than basic positive moods.
Elevation has been deﬁned as the emotional reaction to moral excellence,
that is, it is experienced when observing somebody perform a morally praise-
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worthy action (Haidt 2003). One of the most critical consequences of feeling
elevated and uplifted is the desire to want to become a good person, and help
others (Algoe and Haidt 2009). In other words, when seeing somebody else do
a good deed, people are inspired to do a good deed themselves. Freeman et al.
(2009) showed that induced feelings of elevation increased donations to a
black charity from people who are normally unlikely to contribute, namely
whites scoring highly on attitudes indicative of anti-black racism.
To induce elevation, recent work used a video clip from the television pro-
gram the “Oprah Winfrey Show” in which a successful musician from a disad-
vantaged background thanks his mentor. The video clip shows the reunion
between mentor and student, and the emotional response of the mentor as he
listens to the student describing how his life was changed by the support that
he was given. Silvers and Haidt (2008) found that after watching this clip,
mothers with young infants performed more positive social behaviors toward
their infants, such as hugging and nursing, compared to mothers who watched
a comedy clip that was merely entertaining. In other research using the same
elevation-inducing clip, paid research participants who experienced elevation
were more likely to volunteer to take part in a second unpaid study than partic-
ipants who were in a neutral mood (Schnall et al. 2010). Further, participants
who experienced elevation helped the experimenter by completing a boring
math questionnaire for much longer than participants who either watched a
neutral or a comedy video clip (Schnall et al. 2010). Findings such as these
suggest that moral emotions with powerful social implications can be elicited
by uplifting and inspiring content presented in regular television programs.
More speciﬁcally within organizational contexts, Vianello et al. (2010)
showed that when leaders showed self-sacriﬁce for the organization and dem-
onstrated fair behavior toward employees, this resulted in feelings of moral ele-
vation in their subordinates, which in turn led to greater commitment to the
organization on their part. Thus, feelings of elevation can set in motion a host
of beneﬁcial thoughts and behaviors, presumably because when being
presented with a moral role-model, people feel inspired to live up to a high
standard of moral excellence.
In contrast to elevation where the observer does not directly beneﬁt from a
benefactor’s action, gratitude occurs when one is the actual beneﬁciary of
another person’s intentional efforts to provide a beneﬁt. In addition to wanting
to pay back the benefactor, recipients report a desire to tell others about that
person’s beneﬁcial behavior, which serves to enhance the benefactor’s reputa-
tion (Algoe and Haidt 2009). People further engage in increased helping
behavior when they feel gratitude, and do so not only toward their benefactors,
but also toward strangers (Bartlett and DeSteno 2006). Gratitude, however, is
more than just the desire to repay one’s benefactor and reciprocate other peo-
ple’s kindness and generosity, perhaps in order to get rid of possibly unpleas-
ant feelings of indebtedness. One critical function of it appears to be the
initiation and maintenance of lasting personal relationships (Algoe et al. 2008).
In romantic relationships, feelings of gratitude were found to be predictive of
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relationship quality for both recipient and benefactor (Algoe et al. 2010). In
organizational contexts, gratitude can create lasting work relationships that are
beneﬁcial for the individuals concerned, as well as the organization as a whole
(Emmons 2003). Further, spiritual people report higher levels of gratitude on a
daily basis than people who do not consider themselves spiritual, presumably
because they experience a relationship to something greater than themselves
(McCullough et al. 2002).
On the side of the benefactor, expressions of gratitude compel people to
engage in yet more prosocial behavior, both toward those who thanked them,
but also toward others (Grant and Gino 2010). For example, fund raisers for a
university who received an explicit expression of gratitude from their boss
made about 50% more fund-raising calls on behalf of their university than their
colleagues who had not been thanked.
Both moral elevation and gratitude have thus been found to inspire
prosocial behavior. Admiration, as another positive emotion that is distinct
from general positive emotions such as happiness (Algoe and Haidt 2009),
occurs when one is impressed by another person’s skill or ability outside the
moral domain, for example, by another person’s athletic of intellectual accom-
plishments. When feeling admiration, people describe being energized and
motivated to work hard to achieve their own goals, so in contrast to elevation
and gratitude that are oriented toward other people and enhancing relationships
with them, admiration increases the focus on the self and one’s personal goals
and aspirations (Algoe and Haidt 2009).
Among the positive moral emotions, the one that stands out as being
especially related to feelings of transcendence is awe, which is deﬁned by two
features: First, a feeling of being overwhelmed by the recognition that some-
thing is greater than the self, and second, a need for accommodation, that is,
an attempt to comprehend a process or entity that is difﬁcult to understand
because it is so different from ordinary experience (Keltner and Haidt 2003).
Experiences of awe and transcendence may have powerful effects on people’s
relationships with others and their personal connection to work, but to date,
there has been very little empirical research on the topic, presumably because
it is difﬁcult to induce states of awe, which by deﬁnition are extraordinary, in
typical experimental situations. Existing evidence (Shiota et al. 2007) suggests
that thinking of an awe-inspiring experience from the past leads to seeing one-
self as part of a greater whole, and experiencing self-diminishing emotions
such as feeling small and insigniﬁcant, and feeling the presence of something
greater than the self. Further research is needed to explore the beneﬁts of this
self-transcendent emotion on people’s lives, both in private and work
situations.
The research reviewed above in the context of positive moral emotions sug-
gests that sometimes feelings that people are not even aware of can inﬂuence
their actions. In addition to emotional factors, other incidental factors can
inﬂuence people’s moral behavior. Social factors inﬂuence whether people
follow norms. In an ofﬁce environment where people took milk for their tea or
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coffee but often did not contribute to the cost, Bateson et al. (2006) simply
put up a poster on the wall, and alternated between posters with a pair of eyes
or with a control image of ﬂowers. When exposed to the eyes, people paid
more often for the milk than when exposed to the control image, presumably
because on some level the eyes invoked the sense of social presence, of being
watched. In contrast, people engage in more immoral behavior when they feel
like nobody is watching them; participants cheated more in a poorly lit room
than a brightly lit room, and behaved more selﬁshly when they wore sun-
glasses (Zhong et al. 2010a). This ﬁnding suggests that when feeling relatively
anonymous, people feel that social norms are less binding. Finally, other envi-
ronmental factors play a role: when listening to music with prosocial lyrics,
people put more money in a donation box for a non-proﬁt charity than partici-
pants listening to music with neutral lyrics (Greitemeyer 2009). Thus, as is the
case for moral judgment, moral actions can be sparked by incidental factors
that have very little to do with rational consideration or logical analysis.
Striving for moral equilibrium
People are keen to view themselves as morally good. Somebody who cheats
on his income taxes, has the occasional extramarital affair, and never visits his
ill mother in the nursing home can probably come up with plenty of reasons
and justiﬁcation for his behavior, and on some level may still feel like he is
overall a pretty decent, morally upstanding person. Perhaps, he donates to
charity on a regular basis, recycles old newspapers, and drives a hybrid car,
and when questioned about his not-so ethical behaviors, he might be quick to
point to his more ethical pursuits. Indeed, research evidence is accumulating to
suggest that when people’s positive moral self-concept is questioned, they
engage in various behaviors intended to restore it, as if wanting to assure
themselves that they are indeed “good” people. In contrast, when people are
relatively certain about their moral integrity, they are not motivated to do any
further good, a phenomenon termed “moral licensing” (Monin and Miller
2001, Sachdeva et al. 2009, Zhong et al. 2009, Merritt et al. 2010). In other
words, in people’s mind, one good deed prevents the need for another.
In one of the earliest studies on this phenomenon, Monin and Miller (2001)
provided some of their participants with an opportunity to afﬁrm their creden-
tials as non-prejudiced people, for example, by disagreeing with sexist state-
ments or making a hiring decision in favor of a person from a stereotyped
ethnic group. In subsequent tasks, those participants exhibited more prejudicial
opinions than participants who did not have the earlier opportunity of showing
themselves to be unbiased. In other words, people who in one context showed
that they were not prejudiced acted all the more prejudiced in a subsequent
context. Further, in a study on political attitudes, participants who in a ﬁrst
task indicated a voting preference for Barak Obama favored Whites in a
second task (Effron et al. 2009).
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In addition to moral licensing in stereotyping, it has also been examined
with respect to prosocial behavior. Sachdeva et al. (2009) conducted experi-
ments that allowed participants to think of themselves in a favorable light
before being provided with the opportunity to engage in helping behavior. Par-
ticipants who had copied positive trait words and used them in a story about
themselves indicated they would donate less to a charity and cooperate less in
an environmental task than participants who wrote a story involving neutral
words. Presumably, thinking about their own positive qualities conﬁrmed par-
ticipants’ moral integrity, and as a consequence, reduced any desire to engage
in prosocial behavior.
Monin (2007) proposed that when people witness another person’s excep-
tional moral behavior, they engage in a process of upward social comparison,
which may indicate that one’s own moral actions are below standard. One
response to this threat is to engage in a behavior that restores one’s self-worth,
such as helping somebody in need. Inspiring role models thus either motivate
people to also excel or prompt them to become defensive and downplay the
accomplishments of the model (e.g. Lockwood and Kunda 1997). Nelson and
Norton (2005) showed that priming participants with the general category of
“superhero” led to increased helping, whereas priming with the speciﬁc exem-
plar of “Superman” led to decreased helping. Experimental instructions were to
describe the characteristics of a superhero (or of Superman), and to list behav-
iors and values associated with such a superhero (or Superman). Thus, in their
work, being confronted with a speciﬁc person that was morally good at a level
beyond what was humanly possible made people question their own moral
credentials.
With respect to ethical behavior in the real world, Mazar and Zhong (2010)
showed that after engaging in ethical, “green” consumerism, people sometimes
make up for it later on. Participants who in a research study engaged in
“green” consumer choices showed more lying and stealing in the same study
(Mazar and Zhong 2010). Across time, people alternate between ethical and
unethical decisions (Zhong et al. 2010c). MBA students were presented with
moral dilemmas involving business situations, such as keeping surplus gift
vouchers that are intended for company employees, or keeping quiet when a
company offers you a great job because they mistakenly believe that you
graduated at the top of your class. When dealing with multiple such dilemmas,
ethical decisions early on led to unethical decisions later on, and vice versa. It
is almost as if people use another embodied concept, namely the notion of
balance, which is derived from the physical sensation of keeping one’s body
balanced (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) when keeping track of their own moral
and immoral actions. Based on these ﬁndings on what they term compensatory
ethics, Zhong and colleagues (2010c) note a provocative implication for the
work place: Managers should refrain from praising their employees’ moral
standards, because this could lead to subsequent immoral action. Instead,
questioning others’ moral standards might compel them to engage in moral
action in order to increase their moral self-worth.
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Morality in the workplace: possible implications
The present paper has focused on emotional and situational factors that inﬂu-
ence moral decisions. Of course, individual differences need to be considered
as well. Not only do people differ in terms of how important being a moral
person is to them (Aquino and Reed 2002), but they also differ in terms of
how susceptible they are to organizational pressures to do immoral things
(Comer and Vega 2011), and such dispositional factors require further research
attention. We have seen that the study of moral and ethical behavior can be
split into the study of what one ought to do and how one actually does it.
Although it might seem intuitive that careful thought and consideration are
essential to arrive at ethical decisions, such assumptions about the rational nat-
ure of how we make day-to-day moral decisions have been challenged by the
mounting evidence supporting intuition-based approaches (e.g. Haidt 2001). In
fact, contrary to what one might expect, having more time to deliberate before
making a decision on a moral dilemma actually can lead to less ethical deci-
sions than when having little time to think carefully (Zhong et al. 2010c).
Based upon the most recent evidence, the following conclusions can be
drawn. First, moral judgments and decisions are not always guided by rational
consideration, but instead, are inﬂuenced by seemingly irrelevant concerns,
such as avoiding feeling disgust, and seeking out clean states of body and
mind. As such, the moral domain is no different from other domains of cogni-
tive processing, for which ample evidence suggests that much processing takes
places outside of conscious awareness (cf. Wilson 2002). Second, emotions
can also inﬂuence behavior, and positive moral emotions such as elevation and
gratitude can be harnessed to produce beneﬁcial outcomes for individuals and
organizations alike. Third, people appear to keep track of their moral self-
worth, and aspire to a certain level of moral equilibrium, and their behavior is
aimed at maintaining this moral equilibrium.
What are the implications of this research for people’s spiritual concerns in
the workplace? Based on common sense, one might think that the best way
to ensure that ethical standards are followed in an organizational context is to
ﬁnd people who have high moral standards, and put them in charge. Simi-
larly, just like morality can be considered as something that resides in a per-
son or as something that manifests itself in speciﬁc behaviors in certain
contexts, spirituality can both refer to what a person is and what a person
does (Giacalone and Jurkiewicz 2010b). Based on the research we reviewed,
morality and ethical behavior is less likely to reside in the person than in the
context, and thus, for the study of spirituality, it might be equally beneﬁcial
to focus on people’s situational constraints in the workplace rather than their
stable dispositions. In this context, we agree with Giacalone and Jurkiewicz’s
(2010b) conclusion that not separating religion and spirituality may hamper
scientiﬁc progress because many stable religious beliefs and persuasions are
difﬁcult to test empirically, whereas situational concerns related to spirituality
can be studied in much the same way as some of the factors involved in the
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study of morality. In addition, while promoting religion in the workplace can
be problematic because it might open itself up to subjective, faith-based con-
siderations (Mitroff 2003), this is less of a concern when dealing with more
transient spiritual factors.
Further, deﬁnitional problems of religion and spirituality can be overcome
by operationalizing various aspects of spirituality in terms of speciﬁc values
(Jurkiewicz and Giacalone 2004). They outline a list of values that are impli-
cated in spirituality in the workplace. Such an approach has the distinct beneﬁt
of making it possible to link the existing research ﬁndings generated within
experimental psychology (for a review see Maio 2010) with consideration of
spirituality, thus allowing direct empirical tests. As far as morality is concerned,
two speciﬁc values from Jurkiewicz and Giacalone’s (2004) list that are relevant
within spirituality are integrity and justice; however, as reviewed above, some-
what counterintuitive values such as purity can be highly inﬂuential as well.
The goal of work environments has to be to produce positive outcomes,
ideally for the individual and the organization alike. However, sometimes
because of the very pressures that come with responsibilities distributed across
many people, seemingly good intentions can have disastrous consequences
when individuals fail to appreciate all consequences of their actions (Adam
and Balfour 1998). People not only do evil things unintentionally or due to
lack of consideration, but sometimes the same evolved principles that provide
the basis for moral concerns can be co-opted to produce moral evil (Graham
and Haidt 2012). For example, in the same way in which identiﬁcation toward
one’s in-group can inspire loyalty, when turned against others it can seemly
justify harsh treatment of traitors, or members of the out-group. Similarly,
respect for authority and tradition can form the foundation for social institu-
tions, but equally lead to unspeakable atrocities (Graham and Haidt 2012).
Organizations therefore have to take great care that group processes do not
lead to the erosion of norms such that immoral actions become seemingly
acceptable simply because group standards have shifted.
The conclusion that morality appears to be not so much inherent to a per-
son, but instead emerges from situational constraints that determine a person’s
emotions and motivations, suggests one important take-away message, namely
that while moral character and moral values are probably important (Bass and
Steidlmeier 1999), there are various additional factors that reside in the situa-
tion. This may be both good news and bad news at the same time: On the one
hand, this means that most people are neither extremely virtuous nor extremely
evil. Thus, a company may not need to try to identify ways to ﬁnd the most
ethical person when it comes to hiring decisions, because on average, most
people anyway have the desire to feel that they are morally upstanding individ-
uals. On the other hand, if relatively minor factors such as one’s current mood
can have consequences for people’s morality, it might be difﬁcult to try to
intentionally inﬂuence or control all such factors.
Given the potential of positive moral emotions to inspire positive action, it
might be especially worthwhile to consider how such experiences can become
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part of everyday work contexts. For example, overt displays of gratitude and
appreciation can be very rewarding not just for the individual, but for the orga-
nization as a whole (Grant and Gino 2010). Further, witnessing people in
power do “the right thing” leads to feelings of moral elevation, which in turn
cement employees’ identiﬁcation with their company (Vianello et al. 2010).
Finally, feelings of awe and transcendence could be made part of company-
level retreats, by sharing extraordinary experiences of nature, or participating
jointly in special cultural events. These are just a few possibilities; if one takes
seriously the notion that positive emotions create social bonds and moral com-
mitments, many other possibilities may open up.
If emotional factors play such an important role, should attempts be made
to ﬁnd leaders that are high on emotional intelligence? (Mayer et al. 2008)
Although this might be useful in some respects, Kilduff et al. (2010) have
pointed to the “dark side” of emotional intelligence, namely the fact that
people who are good at certain aspects of emotional intelligence (e.g. read-
ing other people’s emotions or strategically modulating their own emotions)
can use this ability to their own advantage in highly competitive work
situations.
In general, a classic ﬁnding in social psychology is that when making sense
of others’ behavior, people tend to overestimate the contribution of the per-
son’s character (“he’s prone to anger”) relative to the contribution of the situa-
tion (“somebody insulted him”) (Jones and Harris 1967). As we have
reviewed, plenty of situational factors can inﬂuence whether people consider
others’ behavior moral or immoral, and whether they themselves act morally
or immorally. For organizational and work contexts, an important implication
is therefore that in order to facilitate moral and ethical behavior, the goal is not
so much the search for the moral person who would then be an ideal leader or
employee, but to provide the contextual conditions that facilitate ethical con-
duct. Further, because many of the factors linking spiritual and moral concerns
operate on an emotional and intuitive level, stimulating relevant emotional
experiences of elevation, admiration, and awe in the workplace might be more
effective that trying to target people’s conscious mental strategies. Doing
so might appeal directly to people’s intrinsic desire of reaching for higher
meaning while keeping a clean conscience.
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